53: Munich 1938

Ludwig August Theodor Beck was a German general who served as Chief of the German General Staff from 1933 to 1938. He had no moral objection to the idea of a war of aggression to eliminate Czechoslovakia as a state. However, Beck felt that Germany needed more time to rearm before starting such a war. In Beck's assessment, the earliest date Germany could risk a war was 1940, and any war that was started in 1938 would be a "premature war" that Germany would lose. Most of the generals felt that the idea of starting a war in 1938 was highly risky, but none of them would confront Hitler with a refusal to carry out orders since most of them thought that Beck's arguments against war in 1938 were flawed.

In a June 1938 General Staff study, Beck concluded that Germany could defeat Czechoslovakia but that to do so would leave western Germany empty of troops, which could allow the French to seize the Rhineland with little difficulty. Beck maintained that Czechoslovak defenses were very formidable, Prague could mobilize at least 38 divisions and at least 30 German divisions would be needed to break through, which required a campaign of at least three weeks. Beck concluded that Hitler's assumptions about a limited war in 1938 were mistaken.

After trying to persuade other generals to resign, Beck resigned alone on 18 August. He was replaced, as head of the General Staff, by General Franz Halder. At Hitler's request, Beck kept his resignation secret and thus nullified the protest value of his resignation.

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On September 15, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain met with Hitler at the Berghof to discuss the Sudeten crisis.

"For three hours," writes Ian Kershaw, "Hitler and Chamberlain talked as the peace of Europe hung in the balance. Hitler paraded the German grievances, with occasional outbursts against Beneš. Chamberlain listened expressionless as the storm outside swelled to match the menacing atmosphere inside the alpine retreat. He said he was prepared to consider any solution to accommodate German interests, as long as force was ruled out."

Hitler replied with some heat, "Who is speaking of force? Herr Beneš is using force against my countrymen in the Sudetenland. Herr Beneš, and not I, mobilized in May. I won't accept it any longer. I'll settle this question myself in the near future one way or another."

"If I've understood you correctly," Chamberlain answered with anger, "then you're determined in any event to proceed against Czechoslovakia. It that is your intention, why have you had me coming to Berchtesgaden at all? Under these circumstances it's best if I leave straight away. Apparently, it's all pointless."

Kershaw calls this reply an effective counter-thrust to Hitler's bluster. To the astonishment of Hitler's interpreter, the Führer retreated.

"If you recognize the principle of self-determination for the treatment of the Sudeten question, then we can discuss how to put the principle into practice," said Hitler.

Chamberlain said he would have to consult his cabinet, then he declared his readiness to meet Hitler again after doing so. The mood lifted. The British Prime Minister had secured the Führer's agreement to not undertake military action in the meantime.

"Immediately after the meeting," writes Kershaw, 'Hitler told Ribbentrop and Weizsäcker what had happened, rubbing his hands with pleasure at the outcome. He claimed he had maneuvered Chamberlain into a corner. His 'brutally announced intention, even at the risk of a general European war, of solving the Czech question' -- he had not spoken of the 'Sudeten questions' -- along with his concession that Germany's territorial claims in Europe would then be satisfied, had, he asserted, forced Chamberlain to cede the Sudetenland. Hitler had, he went on, been unable to reject the proposal of a plebiscite. If the Czechs were to refuse one, 'the way would be clear for the German invasion.' If Czechoslovakia yielded on the Sudetenland, the rest of the country would be taken over later, perhaps the following spring. In any event, there would have to be a war, and during his own lifetime."

Chamberlain flew home and reported to his cabinet. He believed that he had dissuaded Hitler from an immediate march into Czechoslovakia. He also believed Hitler's aims were 'strictly limited.'

"The extent to which Chamberlain had allowed himself to be deluded by the personality and assurances of Germany's dictator,' writes Kershaw, 'is apparent in the private exultation he offered to one of his sisters, Ida, on returning to England: 'In spite of the harshness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face, I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word.'"

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Chamberlain met Hitler again on September 22, 1938, this time in Bad Godesberg on the Rhine River.

"Their meeting began with a shock for Chamberlain," writes Ian Kershaw. "He initially reported how the demands raised at Berchtesgaden had been met. He mentioned the proposed British-French guarantee of the new borders of Czechoslovakia, and the desired German non-aggression pact with the Czechs. He sat back in his chair, a self-satisfied look on his face."

But the British Prime Minister was astounded by Hitler's reply. "I'm sorry, Herr Chamberlain, that I can no longer go into these things. After the development of the last days, this solution no longer applies."

Chamberlain sat bolt upright, angry and astonished. The Führer stated that he could not sign a non-aggression pact with Czechoslovakia until the demands of Poland and Hungary were met. He also had some criticisms of the proposed treaties. Above all, however, the envisaged time-scale was too long.

"Working himself up into a frenzy about Beneš and the alleged terroristic repression of the Sudeten Germans,' writes Kershaw, "he demanded the occupation of the Sudeten territory immediately. Chamberlain pointed out that this was a completely new demand, going far beyond the terms outlined at Berchtesgaden."

The meeting broke up and Chamberlain returned to his hotel, on the other side of the river. But the prime minister and the dictator exchanged a handful of notes throughout the next day. At 11:00 p.m. on the twenty-third, Chamberlain crossed the river to again meet with Hitler.

"The drama of the late-night meeting,' Kershaw write, 'was enhanced by the presence of advisers on both sides, fully aware of the peace of Europe hanging by a thread."

Hitler demanded the complete withdrawal of the Czech army from the Sudetenland by September 28. The withdrawal would have to begin in two days and completed in four.

"That's an ultimatum," Chamberlain protested. "With great disappointment and deep regret I must register, Herr Reich Chancellor, that you have not supported in the slightest my efforts to maintain peace."

At this tense moment, news arrived that Beneš had announced a general mobilization of the Czech armed forces. War now seemed inevitable. After a moment of silence, Hitler whispered to Chamberlain that despite this provocation, he would keep his word and undertake to do nothing against Czechoslovakia. As a special concession, Hitler agreed to a withdrawal date of October 1 -- the date he had previously set for the attack on Czechoslovakia. This time Chamberlain few back to London disappointed -- but not despairing.

The next day, in Berlin, Hitler spoke with Goebbels, who would again write in his diary how brilliant the Führer was. It seems that Hitler was considering a two-stage invasion of Czechoslovakia: first the Sudetenland, and then, at a later date, the rest of the country. Hitler was not bluffing in his plans to take the Sudetenland by force on October 1, if it was not conceded before hand, but he had retreated from the intention to invade the entire country at the beginning of October.

Chamberlain, in the meantime, was hardening his position, with the support of his cabinet. After talks with the French, it was decided that the Czechs would not be pressed into accepting the new terms. Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's closest adviser, would go to Berlin to recommend a supervised transfer of territory. He would also warn Hitler that France would honor its commitments to Czechoslovakia in the event of military action and that Britain would support France.

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Horace Wilson and Nevile Henderson met with Hitler at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on September 26, 1938. Hitler was agitated as the British informed him that the Czechs had rejected the Bad Godesberg terms.

"There's no point at all in somehow negotiating further," he suddenly exploded.

Wilson tried to warn Hitler of the implications of German military action, but this merely provoked him further.

"If France and England was to strike, let them go ahead. I don't give a damn."

The Führer then issued another ultimatum. The Czechs had until 2 p.m. on Wednesday, September 28, to accept the Godesberg terms and German occupation of the Sudetenland by October 1, otherwise, Germany would use military force.

That night, Hitler gave a speech at the Sportpalast in Berlin, to a packed crowd of 20,000. The audience interrupted almost every sentence with fanatical applause, shouts and cheers. When he was finished the crowd chanted "Führer command, we will follow!"

Horace Wilson returned the Chancellery the next morning to inform Hitler that Chamberlain had guaranteed the Czech withdrawal from the Sudetenland if Germany refrained from the use of military force. The Führer replied that the Czechs had just one choice, to accept the terms of the Godesberg Memorandum. If they refused, he shouted, repeating himself two or three times, "I will smash the Czechs.

Wilson replied, "If, in pursuit of her Treaty obligations, France became actively engaged in hostilities against Germany, the United Kingdom would feel obligated to support her."

"If France and England strike, let them do so," Hitler answered in a rage. "It's a matter of complete indifference to me. I am prepared for every eventuality. I can only take not of the position. It is Tuesday today, and by next Monday we shall be at war.

Wilson left, but after Hitler calmed down he had a letter written to Chamberlain, asking the British Prime Minister to persuade the Czech to see reason and assuring him that he had no further interest in Czechoslovakia once the Sudetenland had been incorporated into the Reich.

Late on the afternoon on September 27, a motorized division began a parade through Wilhelmstrasse, past the government buildings, which lasted three hours. Hitler stood at a window as the vehicles rumbled past. According to Nicolaus von Below, his Luftwaffe adjutant, the parade was intended to impress foreign diplomats and journalists.

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On the morning of September 28, 1938, hours before the ultimatum to Czechoslovakia was set to expire, Hitler changed his mind, conceding to demands for a negotiated settlement. "One can't grasp this change,' noted Helmuth Gruscurth. "Führer has given in, and fundamentally." Hitler was responding to a message from Mussolini, but the Italian dictator was just one of many making pleas for such a settlement.

Before Mussolini's critical move, the British and French had also sought to apply maximum pressure on Hitler. Chamberlain expressed his incredulity that the German Chancellor was willing to risk a world war "for the sake of a few days' delay in settling this long-standing problem."

The French ambassador in Berlin, André François-Poncet, was able to get an audience with Hitler on September 28. He warned the Führer that he would not be able to localize a military conflict with Czechoslovakia, but would set Europe ablaze. Since he could get most of his demands met without war, the risk seemed pointless.

The meeting was interrupted by the Italian Ambassador, Bernardo Attolico. The British government had informed Mussolini that it would welcome his mediation on the Sudetenland question. The areas of disagreement were small. While Il Duce supported Germany, he was "of the opinion that the acceptance of the English proposal would be advantageous."

After a moment, Hitler replied, "Tell the Duce I accept his proposal."

Mussolini had given Hitler a way of saving face, but why did he take it?

In contrast to the reactions of the crowd at the Sportpalast to his speech of September 26, the mood in the country as a whole was less than enthusiastic. The journalist William Shirer reported on the reaction of Berliners to the parade on September 27. People ducked into doorways or otherwise ignored the passing of the troops. It was "the most striking demonstration against war I've ever seen."

Reportedly, Hitler was angered by the lack of enthusiasm show by Berliners. It appeared that, whatever the feelings about the Sudeten Germans, only a small fanatical minority thought them worth a war against the western powers.

Hitler, Mussolini Chamberlain, and Edouard Daladier, met in Munich on September 29, and hammered out a deal in thirteen hours, but the real decision had been made a day earlier when Hitler had agreed to Mussolini's proposal for a negotiated settlement.

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After the Munich agreement had been signed, visited Hitler in his apartment in Prinzregentenplatz. After a pleasant talk, the British Prime Minister presented the Reich Chancellor a joint declaration by Germany and Britain to never go to war with one another again. After a moment's hesitation, and with some reluctance, signed the document.

"For him," writes Ian Kershaw, "the document was meaningless. And for him Munich was no great cause for celebration. He felt cheated of the greater triumph which he was certain would have come from the limited war with the Czechs -- his aim all summer. But when the next crisis duly came, he was even more confident that he knew his adversaries: 'Out enemies are small worms,' he would tell his generals in August 1939. 'I saw them in Munich.'

"Hitler was scornful, too, of his generals after Munich. Their opposition to his plans had infuriated him all summer. How he would have reacted had he been aware that no less a person that his new Chief of Staff, General Halder, had been involved in plans for a coup d'etat in the event of war over Czechoslovakia can be left to the imagination. Whether the schemes of the ill-coordinated groups involved is an open question. But with the Munich Agreement, the chance was irredeemably gone.

"Chamberlain returned home to a hero's welcome. But for German opponents of the Nazi regime, who had hoped to use Hitler's military adventurism as the weapon of his own deposition and destruction, Chamberlain was anything but the hero of the hour. 'Chamberlain saved Hitler,' was how they bitterly regarded the appeasement diplomacy of the western powers."

Hitler's prestige and popularity surged after Munich, reaching new heights, his return to Berlin was triumphant. But he was well aware that the euphoria was due to relief that war had been avoided. The Führer was being celebrated as savior of the peace instead of as the "first soldier of the Reich." At this critical moment, in Hitler's eyes, the German people lacked enthusiasm for war.

"The spirit of 1914," writes Kershaw, "had been missing. Psychological rearmament had still to take place."

"Circumstances have compelled me to speak for decades almost solely of peace," declared Hitler in a speech a few weeks after Munich. "It is natural that such a . . . peace propaganda also has its dubious side. It can only too easily lead to the view establishing itself in the minds of many people that the present regime is identical with the determination and will to preserve peace under all circumstances. That would not only lead to a wrong assessment of the aims of this system, but would also above all lead to the German nation, instead of being forearmed in the face of events, being filled with a spirit which, as defeatism, in the long run would take away and must take away the successes of the present regime."

It was necessary, then to transform the psychology of the German people, so that they would see that some things could only be obtained through force. Then the people would need to represent foreign-policy issues in such a way that 'the inner voice of the people itself slowly begins to cry out for the use of force."

"The speech is revealing," writes Kershaw. "Popular backing for war had to be manufactured, since war and expansion were irrevocably bound up with the survival of the regime, and for Hitler's own popularity and prestige on which ultimately, the regime depended. Only through expansion -- itself impossible without war -- could Germany, and the National Socialist regime, survive. This was Hitler's thinking. The gamble for expansion was inescapable. It was not a matter of personal choice.

"The legacy of Munich was fatally to weaken those who might even now have constrained Hitler," continues Kershaw. "Any potential limits -- external and internal -- on his freedom of action instead disappeared. Hitler's drive to war was unabated. And next time he was determined he would not be blocked by last-minute diplomatic maneuvers of the western powers, whose weakness he had seen with his own eyes at Munich."

Source:

Kershaw, I. (2008). Hitler: A Biography. London: W. W. Norton and Company.