55: The Final Countdown

Germany and Russia stunned the world on August 24, 1939, by announcing that they had agreed to a non-aggression pact. The pact was seen as the death warrant for any prospect of alliance with Britain and France. The British and French had been seeking a mutual assistance treaty for more than four months. 

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, colloquially named after Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, was an agreement officially titled the "Treaty of Non-aggression between the Third German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" and signed in Moscow in the early hours of August 24, 1939 (but dated August 23). It was a Non-Aggression Pact between the two countries and pledged neutrality by either party if the other were attacked by a third party. Each signatory promised not to join any grouping of powers that was "directly or indirectly aimed at the other party."

The Soviet Union had been unable to reach a collective-security agreement with Britain and France against Nazi Germany, most notably at the time of the Munich Conference in September 1938. By early 1939 the Soviets faced the prospect of resisting German military expansion in eastern Europe virtually alone, and so they began searching about for a change of policy.

On May 3, 1939, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin fired Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov, who was Jewish and an advocate of collective security, and replaced him with Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Molotov, who soon began negotiations with the Nazi foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop.

The Soviets also kept negotiating with Britain and France, but in the end Stalin chose to reach an agreement with Germany. By doing so he hoped to keep the Soviet Union at peace with Germany and to gain time to build up the Soviet military establishment, which had been badly weakened by the purge of the Red Army officer corps in 1937. The Western democracies' hesitance in opposing Adolf Hitler, along with Stalin's own inexplicable personal preference for the Nazis, also played a part in Stalin's final choice.

The German-Soviet Pact enabled Germany to attack Poland on September 1, 1939, without fear of Soviet intervention. On September 3, 1939, Britain and France, having guaranteed to protect Poland's borders five months earlier, declared war on Germany. Just over two weeks later, on September 17, the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east. These events marked the beginning of World War II.

The German-Soviet Pact consisted of two parts, one public and one secret. The public part was a non-aggression pact in which each signatory promised not to attack the other. They further promised that, should one of the two signatories be attacked by a third country, the other signatory would not provide assistance of any kind to the third country.

The secret part of the pact was a protocol that established Soviet and German spheres of influence in eastern Europe. It recognized Estonia, Latvia, and Bessarabia as falling within the Soviet sphere. The signatories agreed to divide Poland along the line of the Narev, Vistula and San Rivers.

Also according to the agreement, the Soviet Union annexed other territories in its sphere of influence. On November 30, 1939, the Soviets attacked Finland. After a four-month war, they annexed Finnish territory along the Soviet border, particularly the area near Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). In the summer of 1940, the Soviets occupied and incorporated the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They also seized the Romanian provinces of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia.

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The invasion of Poland should have started in the early morning hours of August 26, 1939. Hitler gave the order for the invasion at 3:02 pm on August 25; the attack was to begin at 4:30 am the following morning. But suddenly, at 7:30 pm, he abruptly cancelled the order.

"If the attack had come on 26 August," wrote Richard Overy, "it is difficult to say with certainty that a general war would have broken out two or three days later, as it did in early September. It is also difficult to be certain about why Hitler changed his mind. He was anxious to avoid any repeat of the previous year when had have been forced to abandon his war an accept an international conference. . . . The view in 1938 was that he had lost face over the Munich settlement. Yet here again, in August 1939, Hitler had hesitated."

It seems that Hitler had hoped that the German-Soviet nonaggression pact would lead to the collapse of the Polish-British-French alliance, and allow Germany to launch a swift, successful and localized attack on Poland to which the West could not respond effectively. The affect of the pact, however, did not have much impact on British and French opinion. Intelligence had alerted both government to the possibility of such a pact so it was not a complete surprise.

In France, whose government had placed greater faith in the possibility of a Soviet alliance, the news of the pact was profoundly disappointing. Even so, there was a feeling that the pact made war more likely.

"Almost all the politicians believe there will be war," wrote a French Foreign Office official on August 24. "Those that believe Hitler will step back grow fewer and fewer. And the intransigents accept the idea of war certainly without pleasure, but with anger."

On August 24, the news reached Berlin that Britain would stick by its commitment to Poland, leading Joseph Goebbels to write in his diary that "The war of nerves approaches its climax . . . alarming news from everywhere."

"The reassertion of the commitment to Poland needs little explanation," wrote Overy, "but it has so-often been suggested that Chamberlain, Halifax and Daladier were appeasers looking for a way out of their obligations that their renewed firmness requires some elaboration. I could be argued that many of the factors that inhibited a firm response in the case of the Czech crisis the year before had disappeared. Both Britain and France had accelerated their rearmament during 1939, particularly in the air. . . . The gap between Western and German military strength was much narrower that is usually allowed; by the spring of 1940 the Western allies had more men, more tanks and only marginally fewer aircraft than the Germans.

"A second factor was the state of public opinion," continued Overy, "which had shifted from dread of war and a longing for peace evident in September 1938 to a fatalistic acceptance that war was now unavoidable and should be waged sooner rather than later. . . .

"It would be wrong, nonetheless, to assume that Chamberlain, Halifax and Daladier accepted the risk of war only because they were pressured to do so by public opinion. Each in their own way had come to accept during the course of 1939 that the use of force was necessary in the face of a crumbling European order. Indeed, all three reached this point a year earlier on 28 September 1938, when war would have had to be declared if Hitler unilaterally violated Czech sovereignty, an element of the Munich story that is readily forgotten."

Hitler met with British ambassador Neville Henderson on August 25. "The Chancellor," wrote Henderson later, "spoke with calm and apparent sincerity." The Führer affirmed the necessity of solving the Polish question once and for all, for the sake European stability, but after that spoke of offering Britain the hand of friendship "as decisive as the move as regards Russia," which had resulted in an unexpected pact. He promised to guarantee the British Empire and come to its defense. The result, he concluded, might be "a blessing for Germany and the British Empire." This was, he said, "his last offer."

Henderson flew to London the following day -- after the hour the war was supposed to have begun. A draft of the response to Hitler's final offer was finished on August 28

The crisis during the evening of August 25 resulted from Hitler's lack of understanding regarding the arts of diplomacy and political finesse, which he had failed to learn from years of political struggle. He recognized that war with the West was one of the possibilities, but his efforts to split the British off from the Poles indicates his preference for a localized conflict.

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Hitler did not take seriously the idea that Britain and France would go to war to defend Poland. They did. Hitler, btw, wrote in Mein Kampf that France had to be punished. It was Britain he did not want war with.

Of course, Hitler at one point said he wanted nothing more than the Sudetenland, only to dismantle the remainder of Czechoslovakia about 6 months later. That betrayal led to Britain & France backing Poland in Sept. 1939.

Having gone to war over Poland, Britain could not accept a peace that did not mean the liberation of Poland, and Hitler could not be trusted to honor a peace deal -- see Operation Barbarossa.

"Defeat is one thing, disgrace is another."

-- Sir Winston Churchill

A peace agreement leaving Poland occupied would have been a disgrace.

Hitler hoped the non-aggression pact with the Soviets would lead to the collapse of the Polish-British-French alliance, and allow Germany to launch a swift, successful and localized attack on Poland to which the West could not respond effectively. Instead, it made war more likely.

Britain responded to news of the pact by notifying Berlin that it would stick to its commitment to Poland. Both Britain & France had come to accept that force was necessary in the face of a crumbling European order. Both had accelerated rearmament after Munich to narrow the gap.

On 8/25/39 Hitler offered Britain the "hand of friendship" & promised to guarantee the British Empire and come to its defense. Britain turned this down and were not inclined to accept it a year later when a similar offer was made.

Hitler did not believe Britain and France would choose war, because he did not want them to, even as Britain and France believed that war might still be avoided if they could make it perfectly clear that they would choose war if Hitler invaded Poland.

The general view of the causes of the Second World War (the "Nuremberg Thesis") was that Hitler had wanted war, planned in detail for war and had launched the war. He was supported by other Nazis but not by the German people, who were innocent victims of the Nazi regime.

A.J.P. Taylor broke with this consensus with five main themes:

First, foreign policy is determined by reasons of state and the necessity of reacting to foreign threats, rather than driven by internal politics such as economic or ideological factors.

Second, that Hitler possessed strategic goals but no thought-out grand scheme as to how and when these goals would be achieved.

Third, that Hitler's goals were the same as those of other German politicians such as Gustav Stresemann.

Fourth, that Hitler was an opportunist, taking advantage of events provided by the French and British governments, rather than working according to a timetable.

Fifth, that in destroying the Treaty of Versailles and invading Poland, Hitler had the support of the German people.

Sources:

Overy, R. (2010). 1939: Countdown to War. New York: Penguin.

Taylor, A. J. P., (1961). The Origins of the Second World War. New York: Fawcett World Library.